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Even before the start of their second year inoffice, commentators were already reading thetea leaves on Samuel A. Alito, Jr. and John G.
Roberts, Jr. According to the
prominent legal scholar
Erwin Chemerinsky, the two
new justices “were every bit
as conservative as conserva-
tives had hoped and progres-
sives had feared. [Their]
willingness to overrule
decades-old precedents certainly gives a sense that major
changes are likely ahead in constitutional law in the years
to come.”1 Chemerinsky was hardly alone; similar forecasts
appeared on the editorial pages of newspapers as ideo-
logical disparate as the Wall Street Journal and the New York
Times, as well as hundreds, if not thousands, of blogs
across the country. 
Forecasting of this sort—a veritable cottage industry
each time a new justice completes a term or two of serv-
ice—may seem harmless enough and sufficiently
divorced from the concerns of empirical legal studies to
ignore. Nonetheless, the entire enterprise rests on a
strong empirical assumption, which, in fact, has impor-
tant implications for systematic scholarship: that one can
draw high-quality inferences about the justices’ long-term
ideological tendencies from their first few terms in office.
Is this a plausible assumption? Unfortunately, and
despite decades of study, we cannot offer a conclusive
answer. To some, most notably Hagle, reliance on initial
voting records to predict future behavior borders on the
absurd.2 Most justices, he empirically demonstrated, mani-
fest unstable behavior in their “freshman” year relative to
the balance of their career. To
other scholars, most recently
Shipan, predictions based on
the first term are not particu-
larly troubling.3 The instability
identified by Hagle, they say,
appears insufficiently wide-
spread to be “considered a
general phenomenon.”4 In between comes work by Wood
et al., which found that roughly half the justices under
analysis experienced “acclimation” effects.5
On the perils
of drawing
inferences
about
Supreme
Court justices
from their 
first few
years of
service
by Lee Epstein, Kevin Quinn, 
Andrew D. Martin, and Jeffrey A. Segal
We thank the Center for Empirical Research in the Law, the National Science
Foundation, and the Northwestern University School of Law Beatrice Kuhn
Research Fund for supporting our research. Quinn also wishes to acknowledge
the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences for its hospitality and
support. The project’s web site [epstein.law.northwestern.edu/research/
firstyear.html] houses a full replication archive, including the data and docu-
mentation necessary to reproduce our results. Please send all correspondence
to Andrew Martin, Washington University School of Law, Campus Box 1120, St.
Louis MO 63130. admartin@wustl.edu; 314.935.5863.
1. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Kennedy Court: October Term 2005, 9 GREEN BAG
335, at 346 (2006). Our emphasis.
2. Timothy Hagle, Freshman Effects for Supreme Court Justices, 37 AM. J. POL.
SCI. 1142 (1993).
3. Charles R. Shipan, Acclimation Effects Revisited, 40 JURIMETRICS J. 243
(2000).
4. Id.
5. Sandra L.Wood, et al., ‘Acclimation Effects’ for Supreme Court Justices: A
Cross-Validation, 1888-1940,” 42 AM. J. POL. SCI 690 (1998).
6. See, e.g., Mark S. Hurwitz and Joseph V. Stefko, Acclimation and Attitudes:
‘Newcomer’ Justices and Precedent Conformance on the Supreme Court, 57 POL. RES.
Q. 121 (2004).
The ideological boxes into which 
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Alito, Jr. and John G. Roberts, Jr.
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In what follows, we hope to bring
a fresh eye to this seemingly age-old
but nonetheless on-going debate.6
Drawing on methodological strate-
gies that we used to examine ideolog-
ical drift on the Supreme Court,7 we
first contemplate the literature’s pri-
mary concern: to what extent do new
justices evince different or unstable
behavior in their first year relative to
all others? Or, to frame it in more
contemporary terms, to what extent
can we reach high-quality inferences
about the justices’ long-term ideolog-
ical preferences based on one-
year’s—the first-year’s—-worth of
observations?
Finding that Hagle and others in
his camp have the better case—-all
but 4 of the 26 justices we investi-
gated exhibited statistically signifi-
cant ideological drift from their
initial preferences—-we turn to ques-
tions of substantive importance.
Specifically, we demonstrate that
movement away from first-year ideal
points occasionally manifests itself in
consequential doctrinal change—-so
consequential that a vote in favor of,
say, restricting privacy rights or per-
mitting prayer in school in the first
term might translate into a vote in
opposition before the justice con-
cludes his or her first decade of serv-
ice. These findings, compatible with
our previous work documenting
extensive ideological movement on
the part of Court members through-
out their careers,8 continue to
demonstrate that the ideological
boxes into which policy makers,
scholars, and lawyers place justices at
the time of their appointment are
not so tightly sealed.
Inferring future behavior
Inferring future behavior from a jus-
tice’s first few years in office hardly
began with John Roberts and Samuel
Alito; in fact, the legal historian
George L. Haskins supplies com-
pelling evidence that the practice
dates nearly as far back as the Court
itself.9 Surely, though, the most
(in)famous modern-day example
came after Harry A. Blackmun’s first
year of service. The Minneapolis-born
Blackmun was so closely aligned with
his boyhood friend, the conservative
Chief Justice Warren Burger, that
commentators of the day tagged him
a “Minnesota Twin.”
While this turned out to be a stun-
ning misnomer, it hardly put the
brakes on future forecasting. Quite
the opposite. Since Blackmun, virtu-
ally every justice has been the object
of prediction. After examining Lewis
F. Powell’s first term in office, one
columnist opined that the new justice
is emerging “as the conservative’s
strong man,” who will ultimately help
“write some pretty good law.”10 Five
years later, Justice Scalia was quickly
branded Chief Justice Rehnquist’s
“ideological compatriot.”11 Of David
Souter, the chair of the Democratic
National Committee declared that he
“is slowly demonstrating his loyalty to
Republican extremism.”12 Analysts too
tried to draw inferences about Justice
Kennedy from his first-year record,
even though Kennedy (much like
Alito) had served for only six months.
Bruce Fein, the conservative com-
mentator, declared “there was a clear
showing that Justice Kennedy will be
in the conservative bloc.”13 The edi-
tors of the New York Times agreed, as
did a host of other long-time Court
observers.14
Nonetheless, it is hard to deny that
tasseography may have reached new
heights with Roberts’ and Alito’s
ascensions to the high Court. What
with bloggers now joining journalists
and scholars, forecasting future ideo-
logical tendencies based on a year or
less of service has become something
of a cottage industry. And a fast-mov-
ing cottage industry at that. Attracting
substantial attention just a year after
Alito and Roberts took their seats was
Greenburg’s Supreme Conflict, famous
for its punchline that the two Bush
appointees have succeeded in moving
the Court to the right.15
But what inferences can we really
draw? Linda Greenhouse, the astute
New York Times reporter, suggests we
should refrain from the practice alto-
gether. “A Justice’s first year on the
Court, or even first few years,” she
once observed, “are notoriously poor
indicators of that Justice’s eventual
role”16. No doubt, a non-trivial frac-
tion of justices would agree. As
William J. Brennan, Jr. once said,
There is nothing that you do that pre-
pares you for this job. Even Felix Frank-
furter used to say that his lifelong study
of the Court never really prepared him
for this job. You simply cannot study it
from afar and expect to know it. You
simply cannot know how you will
respond to the legal issues as a Justice,
as opposed to a law professor, or a
judge on a court of appeals or even a
state supreme court. I know that was cer-
tainly true of me.17
Social scientists are less certain but
hardly for lack of effort. In a line of
inquiry dating back to the 1950s,18
though picking up considerable steam
in the 1970s into the 2000s, nearly
countless analysts sought to determine
whether new justices evince different
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or unstable behavior during their first
year or so—a period of acclimation on
the Court—than in the years to fol-
low.19 Their findings, as we noted at
the outset, have been mixed to say the
least. Even if we confine ourselves
exclusively to studies of voting,20
empirical results run the gamut from
nearly complete agreement with the
Greenhouse/Brennan sentiment to
nearly complete disagreement.21
Why the mixed findings is a ques-
tion with many possible answers.22
Far more relevant here is a common-
alty, not a point of distinction,
among the existing work: Regardless
of their conclusions, recent discipli-
nary developments have rendered
features of the extant studies prob-
lematic at best and obsolete at worst.
Of particular concern are the meas-
urement strategies they deploy; we
are also troubled by their approach
to research design.
Let us elaborate, beginning with
design—specifically with the issue of
how to determine whether new jus-
tices are unstable in their voting.
While approaches vary from study to
study, a prominent one is to com-
pare, say, the percentage of conserva-
tive votes cast in the justice’s first
term, with the mean percentage of
conservative votes cast thereafter.23 If
a difference emerges, then analysts
claim they have found evidence of a
freshman effect—meaning, to use
our terminology, that it would be a
mistake to draw inferences about the
long term based on observations
from the first year.
Because this design has its share of
intuitive appeal, we understand why
scholars have invoked it. Nonethe-
less, as Shipan correctly observed, it
can inadvertently lead to rather
severe errors of inference. To see
the why, consider Figure 1, in which
we present the voting patterns in the
area of constitutional criminal pro-
cedure for two hypothetical justices,
L(eft Panel) and R(ight Panel).
Notice that the left panel appears to
present few problems for the con-
ventional approach: Because Justice
L cast only 10 percent of her votes in
favor of defendants in her first term
and 60 percent in all others (p .05),
scholars would likely conclude that
L’s first-term behavior reveals little
about the balance of her career.24
But what of the right panel? Would
we be able to make high-quality infer-
ences about Justice R’s career based
on his freshman preferences? Under
conventional methods, the answer is
yes: Because no significant difference
emerges between R’s voting in Term 1
(10 percent) versus the mean of all
others (20 percent), first-year behav-
ior provides a plausible predictor of
future behavior. The obvious prob-
lem with this, the conventional
response, is that it fails to attend Jus-
tice R’s dramatic move to the left even
before the end of his first decade of
service. Only by developing a design
plan capable of capturing the fact that
for both R and L evidence of unstable
behavior emerges—in fact, evidence
sufficiently ample to suggest that infer-
ences based on the first year would
provide misinformation about overall
career patterns—can we hurdle this
obstacle.
Momentarily, we propose such a
plan. For now, though, it is worth
considering a second, even more
fundamental concern with the exist-
ing literature—one that Figure 1 also
Figure 1: Hypothetical voting patterns 
of two justices in constitutional
criminal procedure cases. 
Justice L, depicted in the left panel, cast 10 percent of her votes in favor of defendants
in her first year and 60 percent in all others. In his first term, Justice R, in the right
panel, also cast 10 percent of his votes in support of defendants. The mean for the rest
of his career is 20 percent.
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brings to light. Note that in creating
the panels we follow the conven-
tional strategy, and depict votes as
raw, term-by-term percentages
(here, percent support for defen-
dants). That approach, however,
fails to attend to changes in the con-
tent of litigation (“case stimuli”)
over time.25
Conceptually, the problem is
straightforward enough. Absent
controls for case stimuli we might
incorrectly assume that a justice
evinces ideological change after her
first term when it well may be the
content of the litigation that
changed.26 As a result, we cannot
attribute the alteration’s source,
whether to instability during a jus-
tice’s early years or to the cases
themselves. Greenhouse recognized
as much when she wrote of the new
justice David Souter, 
While [he] appeared firmly in the con-
servative camp this term, that impres-
sion is due in part to the unusually high
proportion of the term’s cases that
dealt with criminal law and procedure,
the area in which he voted most consis-
tently with Chief Justice Rehnquist.”27
Greenhouse’s commentary well
captures the flavor of the problem
but, because case stimuli can vary in
discrete areas of law, it is likely more
severe than even she cast it. To pro-
vide but one example, consider a
justice—call her Justice M(oder-
ate)—who has served on the Court
for two terms. Suppose that in her
first term, Justice M was quite unsup-
portive of defendants in Fourth
Amendment cases casting only one
out of every ten votes in their favor.
In the next term, however, Justice M
voted to support defendants in nine
of ten cases.
If we looked only at these votes, we
might conclude that Justice M
indeed exhibited unstable, fresh-
man-like, behavior—-moving from
10 percent support of defendants in
her first term to 90 percent support
in her second. But Figure 2 raises
another possibility. Here, the hori-
zontal lines represent a single issue,
Fourth Amendment search and
seizure cases, for two terms (1 and
2). For each term, we have arrayed
the ruling of the relevant lower court
(labeled O), the alternative policies
that could be formulated by a group
of justices (labeled A), and the ideal
points of hypothetical Justice M,
along with Justices L(iberal) and
C(onservative).
Suppose that in Term 1 the justices
review a lower court decision exclud-
ing evidence from a house search on
the ground that the judge lacked
probable cause to issue the warrant
(indicated in Figure 2 by the fairly
leftward-located value of O). Further
assume, as is standard in the social
science literature, that each justice
will cast a vote for the more ideolog-
ically proximate outcome. If this is
so, then—given the choice between
the status quo policy O and an alter-
native policy A, which would, say,
allow the introduction of the evi-
dence on a good faith exception—
Justice L will vote to uphold the
lower court ruling O. Justices M and
C, in contrast, will vote for the good
faith exception A. Indeed, any justice
to the left of the cutpoint—-the mid-
dle location between the status quo
O and alternative A—-will vote to
uphold, and any justice to the right
will vote to overturn.
Now suppose that in Term 2 the
lower court rules that a warrantless
search is valid, thereby producing
the more rightward-located value of
O in Term 2. If, once again, the jus-
tices make a choice between the
lower court ruling O and an alter-
native A, Justice C will again vote
for the more conservative alterna-
tive and Justice L for the more lib-
eral one, A. Note, though, that
Justice M will now also support the
liberal policy, even though her
underlying preferences remained
stable between the two terms. This
implies that just comparing per-
centages of votes can be profoundly
misleading.
Figure 2: Hypothetical Fourth Amendment
search and seizure cases and jus-
tices in ideological space at two
time periods (Term 1 and Term 2)
L, M, and C are the ideal points of the three justices—-a liberal, a moderate, and a
conservative. O represents the status quo policy from a lower court ruling. A is the
alternative policy (that could be) formulated by a group of justices. The cutpoint is the
location halfway between O and A such that the justices to the left would choose the
more liberal outcome, and those on the right the more conservative option.
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A Bayesian dynamic 
ideal point approach 
Until quite recently, overcoming the
twin obstacles of design and espe-
cially measurement posed a serious
challenge to generations of empiri-
cal legal specialists.28 Martin and
Quinn have now devised a solution
at least to the latter and, we believe,
trickier problem of measurement.
Using data derived from the votes
cast by the justices and a Bayesian
modeling strategy, they have gener-
ated term-by-term ideal point esti-
mates for all the justices appointed
since the 1937 term29—estimates that
attend to variation in case content.30
Because the Martin-Quinn (M-Q)
Bayesian dynamic ideal point model
has been described31 and applied
elsewhere,32 only a few words are in
order here. First, not only does
their model allow for ideal points to
change over time but the estimates
are also directly comparable over
time. That is, owing to M-Q’s
approach, we can compare, e.g., Jus-
tice Souter’s revealed preferences in
his first term with his second, third,
fourth, and so on. Second, as we
suggest above, the M-Q method typ-
ically will not conflate changes in
case content and in ideal points:
their model estimates them sepa-
rately. In other words, using M-Q’s
approach we can squarely confront
the question we pose here—to what
extent can we make high-quality
inferences about justices based on
their first-year record—without hav-
ing to consider whether any
changes we observe are the result of
fluctuations in the case content or
in the justice’s revealed prefer-
ences.
Martin and Quinn have dealt with
the problem of measurement, but
what of design? Certainly, for the
reasons we suggest above, we must
avoid the extant literature’s trap of
relying exclusively on a comparison
of a justice’s revealed preferences
(here, measured by the M-Q esti-
mates) in Term 1 with the mean of
all others. We rather require an
approach that is capable of juxtapos-
ing a justice’s initial preferences
against the preferences she expresses
in each term remaining in her
career. Only in this way can we assess
the quality of inferences we can draw
about a justice’s future preferences
based on the first years of service.
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Figure 3: The probability that Justice
Blackmun was more conservative
in subsequent terms than in his
first term.
The vertical axis denotes the estimated probability. If the solid line is above the top
dotted line, then Blackmun was significantly more conservative. If that line is below the
bottom dotted line, then Blackmun was significantly more liberal. The vertical line
represents Blackmun’s tenth year of service.
Harry Blackmun moved so far
that even the most astute
observers of the day could not
possibly have drawn accurate
inferences about his subsequent
behavior based on his first year.
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Our solution to this design
quandary follows from our work on
ideological drift.33 For each of the 26
justices appointed since 1937 and
who served 10 or more terms, we cal-
culate the (posterior) probability
that the justice’s revealed prefer-
ences (i.e., the M-Q ideal point esti-
mates) were more conservative34 in
each subsequent term than her first
term.35 A finding that a justice
exhibits statistically significant dif-
ferences between her freshman year
and more than half of her remain-
ing years ought, we believe, raise
serious concerns about the ability to
forecast future preferences from the
initial term of service.36
Applying these calculations to
each justice readily enables us to
accomplish our primary goal of
determining the extent to which she
or he, in any given term, exhibited
significantly different preferences
than in the first year. To supply a
straightforward example, consider
Figure 3. There we visually depict the
results of our calculations for Harry
Blackmun, specifically, the estimated
probability that he was more conser-
vative (or liberal) in each subsequent
term than in his first. Note that if the
probability is greater than 0.975 (i.e.,
Blackmun’s ideal point estimate is
above the top dotted horizontal
line), then we can conclude that he
was significantly more conservative in
that term than in his first year. Alter-
natively, if the estimated probability is
less than 0.025 (i.e., Blackmun’s ideal
point estimate is below the bottom
dotted line), then we can conclude
that he was significantly more liberal
in that term than in his first. For pur-
poses of making statistical and sub-
stantive inferences, we have added a
vertical line representing Blackmun’s
tenth year of service.
The takeaway from Figure 3 is
inescapable: Blackmun moved so far
from his first-year ideal point that,
despite their best efforts, even the
most astute observers of the day could
not possibly have drawn accurate
inferences about his subsequent
behavior based on his first year. Actu-
ally, because in no term after his third
was he as conservative as he was in his
first, even conventional approaches to
assessing unstable voting would have
picked up the effect; that is, a statisti-
cally significant difference emerges
between Blackmun’s M-Q ideal point
estimate in his first term (1.86) and
the mean M-Q estimate for the rest of
his career (-.19).
Statistical dangers 
of drawing inferences 
Given the spate of commentary on
Blackmun’s judicial “journey,”37 Fig-
ure 3 is likely to come to the surprise
of no one. But what of the other jus-
tices? Is Blackmun the anomaly—the
rare justice for whom inferences
based on first-year behavior would
have been seriously flawed—or the
rule? From a statistical vantage point,
the answer is clear. By their tenth
year of service, 22 of the 26 justices
moved, significantly so, away from
their first-term ideal point estimate
in the majority of their subsequent
terms on the Court. Blackmun, in
short, is clearly unexceptional.
Let us begin, though, with the
exceptions, the four justices—Potter
Stewart, Anthony Kennedy, Warren
Burger, and especially Frank Mur-
phy—whose observed behavior might
36. As we describe in previous work, generating
these posterior probabilities presents no major
difficulties. It is simply a matter of calculating the
fraction of samples generated by the M-Q proce-
dures for which the justice’s ideal point in later
terms was to the right of the baseline value, the
first term. See Epstein, et al., supra n. 7;
Andrew D. Martin and Kevin Quinn, Assessing
Preference Change on the U.S. Supreme Court, 23 J. L.
ECON. & ORG. 365 (2007).
37. See, e.g., Ruger, supra n. 32; Linda Green-
house, BECOMING JUSTICE BLACKMUN: HARRY BLACK-
MUN’S SUPREME COURT JOURNEY (New York: Holt,
2005).
Figure 4: Four justices, appointed since
1937, who were no more liberal
or conservative in more than
half their subsequent terms
than in their first term.
The vertical axis denotes the estimated probability of being more conservative in a
future term. If the solid line in each panel is above the top dotted line, then the justice
is significantly more conservative. If that line is below the bottom dotted line, then the
justice is significantly more liberal. The vertical line within each panel represents the
tenth term of service.
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encourage the forecasters. While it is
true, as we can see in Figure 4, that
Stewart and Kennedy eventually grew
significantly more liberal, our
approach shows that inferences
about their ideology based on their
freshman term would not have been
too far off the mark—at least not for
their first decade in office. 
The same holds for both Burger
and Murphy but their preferences
were even more stable.38 Only in the
Chief’s ninth and tenth terms—
falling near the end of the Carter
presidency—was he significantly
more liberal than in his freshman
year. By the time Ronald Reagan
took office, Burger had drifted back
to the right, revealing preferences
that were statistically indistinguish-
able from his earlier years. As for
Murphy, he represents the true
anomaly in our database: the only
justice who exhibits no significant
preference change between his first
year and any of his remaining terms.
Figure 5: Eleven justices, appointed since
1937, who were more liberal in
subsequent terms than in their
first term.
The vertical axis denotes the estimated probability of being more conservative in
subsequent terms. If the solid line in each panel is above the top dotted line, then the
justice is significantly more conservative. If that line is below the bottom dotted line,
then the justice is significantly more liberal. The vertical line within each panel
represents the tenth term of service.
By their second terms, 
David Souter and Earl Warren
had turned sharply to the left.
38. Murphy and Burger are the only two jus-
tices, who, even under the conventional test, show
no signs of voting instability. That is, a comparison
of their first-year ideal point estimate and the
mean of their remaining terms reveals no statisti-
cally significant difference. We cannot say the
same for any other justice in our database, includ-
ing Stewart and Kennedy.
39. See id.
Frank Murphy represents the true
anomaly: the only justice who
exhibits no significant preference
change between his first year
and any of his remaining terms. 
HARRIS AND EWING, 
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In direct juxtaposition come the 22
justices, who—compared to their first
term—moved to the left, to the right,
or in both directions in more than
half their subsequent terms. Begin-
ning with the largest subset (see Fig-
ure 5), 11 justices, or roughly half
those in our database, were signifi-
cantly more liberal before or at their
tenth term than in their first. For the
majority, movement came almost
immediately. By their second terms,
David Souter and Earl Warren, for
example, had turned sharply to the
left, never to move back. Inferring
much about Tom Clark’s and, of
course, Harry Blackmun’s eventual
preferences based on their first term
too would be deeply problematic in
light of the patterns revealed in Fig-
ure 5. On the other hand, Justice
O’Connor’s preferences remained
relatively stable until her first decade
of service approached, at which point
she grew significantly more liberal.
Composing a somewhat smaller,
though nonetheless notable group
are the nine justices who exhibited
movement in the opposite direction.
As we depict in Figure 6, Black, Bur-
ton, Frankfurter, Harlan, Jackson,
Reed, Scalia, Thomas, and White
were significantly more conservative
by their tenth term than in their
first. But the trends, once again, dif-
fer. For the majority, rightward
movement was not long in coming.
Frankfurter, for example, was on the
Court but two short terms before his
revealed preferences grew quite dis-
tinct from those in his freshman
year. For others, especially White,
change came later—closer to the
decade mark—but it nonetheless
came. Either way, significant move-
ment renders perilous efforts to
characterize even their early career
stages based on their first years.
By virtually all accounts, the two
remaining justices, William O. Dou-
glas and William H. Rehnquist, rep-
resented polar extremes on the
Court and, yet, they evince remark-
ably similar patterns. Relative to
their first year, as Figure 7 indicates,
both were more conservative in at
least some of the years prior to their
tenth. And, by their eighteenth,
both were significantly more liberal
relative to their freshman year. In
other words, for only a few terms
apiece were their revealed prefer-
ences indistinct from their first-year
behavior.
Substantive dangers 
of drawing inferences 
From a statistical vantage point, it
would be difficult to observe the pat-
terns in Figures 4 through 7 and
reach any conclusion other than the
one we have stressed throughout:
Regardless of whether we analyze
preferences on term-by-term basis, as
we have done in the figures, or via
the more conventional approach,39
most justices reveal behavior in sub-
sequent years that differs signifi-
cantly from their first.
But are the statistical findings
compelling enough to dissuade com-
mentators from reaching inferences
about Alito, Roberts, and any future
justices? Likewise, are they suffi-
ciently persuasive to dispel any
doubts about unstable behavior
among the justices?
Because statistical significance may
Figure 6: Nine justices, appointed since
1937, who were more conserva-
tive in subsequent terms than in
their first term.
The vertical axis denotes the estimated probability of being more conservative in
subsequent terms. If the solid line in each panel is above the top dotted line, then the
justice is significantly more conservative. If that line is below the bottom dotted line,
then the justice is significantly more liberal. The vertical line within each panel
represents the tenth term of service.
176 JUDICATURE Volume 91, Number 4  January-February 2008
not translate into substantive impor-
tance, we suspect the answer in both
instances is no. Scalia provides a case
in point. To be sure, as Figure 6 indi-
cates, he was significantly less conser-
vative in his first term than in the
balance of his career. But we cannot
say that commentators of the day
were in error to tag the justice a “con-
servative,” and Figure 8 shows why.
There we display Scalia’s term-by-
term (Martin & Quinn) ideal point
estimates. (For purposes of compari-
son, we also plot the estimates for
O’Connor, a more moderate justice,
and for Stevens, a more liberal jus-
tice.) To be sure, Scalia drifts to the
right, but only in his first two most
“liberal” terms does he even approxi-
mate O’Connor (at her most conser-
vative); and his liberalism comes
nowhere near Stevens’, even in
Stevens’ early, most right-leaning
days.
Antonin Scalia, in short, revealed
conservative preferences at the out-
set of his career, and simply grew
more reliably conservative with time.
Even more to the point, Scalia’s
rightward departure was likely of lit-
tle substantive (doctrinal) conse-
quence, as Figure 9 depicts. Here we
again plot Scalia’s term-by-term
ideal point estimates, along with the
cut point lines for three cases impli-
cating different areas of the law:
Dickerson v. United States (holding
that Miranda v. Arizona was a consti-
tutional decision that Congress
could not overrule by simple legisla-
tion); Adarand Constructors v. Pena
(ruling that all racial classifications
must be subjected to strict scrutiny);
and Lawrence v. Texas (striking down
sodomy laws). The cut points pro-
vide information about the likely
behavior of justices above and below
it, such that if a justice’s ideal point
is above the line, the probability is
greater than .50 that she or he will
cast a conservative vote (i.e., against
Dickerson and Lawrence, and in favor
of Adarand).40
In the case of Adarand, we know
that five justices ruled against the
government’s set-aside program; we
also know that Scalia was among this
group. His estimated ideal point in
Figure 7: Two justices, appointed since
1937, who were both more 
conservative and more liberal in
subsequent terms than in their
first term.
The vertical axis denotes the estimated probability of being more conservative in
subsequent terms. If the solid line in each panel is above the top dotted line, then the
justice is significantly more conservative. If that line is below the bottom dotted line,
then the justice is significantly more liberal. The vertical line within each panel
represents the tenth term of service.
Figure 8: Justices Scalia’s, O’Connor’s, and
Stevens’ estimated ideal points.
The vertical axis is the justice’s estimated ideal point. Higher values are more
conservative.
40. We derive these cut points using the Quinn-
Martin method. Under their approach, the data
and modeling assumptions determine the joint dis-
tribution of the ideal points and the cut points.
While this joint distribution is large and complex, 
it is possible to use the conditional distributions of
the ideal points—given the cut points—and the cut
points—given the ideal points—to fit the model.
For more details, see Quinn  and Martin, supra n.
36; Epstein, et al., supra n. 7.
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1995 was above the line and, in fact,
he was in the majority in Adarand.
But also note the location of his
ideal points in all previous terms,
including in his freshman and soph-
omore years. Because they are above
the cut point, we can safely con-
clude that even at his most moder-
ate moment—coinciding with the
start of his tenure—Scalia would
likely have voted to apply strict
scrutiny to all racial classifications
formulated by the government.
More generally, in looking at all
three cases depicted in Figure 9, in
only Dickerson—and for only three
terms at that—would we predict a
different response had the case
come earlier in Scalia’s tenure.
Of course we have not scrutinized
the cut points of all 1,937 cases
resolved since the 1986 term when
Scalia joined the Court.41 But we sus-
pect that additional analyses would
only confirm the basic lesson of Fig-
ure 8. Because Scalia was sufficiently
conservative in his preferences from
the start of his service, his turn to the
right corresponds to only a marginal
change in his jurisprudence. For
Scalia, to put it somewhat differently,
analyses of statistical and substantive
significance depart. The latter
implies that any inferences based on
Scalia’s first term are not necessarily
as defective as the former suggests.42
For the balance of our justices,
however, statistical significant move-
ment, in all likelihood, led to impor-
tant doctrinal alterations. To provide
a few extreme examples, consider Fig-
ure 10. There we display the ideal
points for Souter and Warren—two
justices who made 180-degree turns
from the preferences revealed in
their first few terms. We also show the
cut point lines for three decisions, all
in the areas of rights and liberties: for
Souter, Rust v. Sullivan (upholding
regulations that prohibit the use of
public funds for abortion counseling)
and Lee v. Weisman (prohibiting a
clergy-led prayer during a public high
school graduation); for Warren, the
landmark Miranda v. Arizona.
Turning first to Souter’s panel,
note that when the Court decided to
uphold the regulations at issue in
Rust, Souter was in the majority.
Given that his revealed preferences
for the 1990 term—his first on the
Court—were north of the Rust cut-
point line, his vote was not a sur-
prise. Nor, for that matter, was his
concurrence in Lee supporting the
Court’s (5-4) decision to prohibit
clergy-led prayers at public school
graduations. His ideal point in the
1991 term was slightly below the Lee
cutpoint line. 
Far more relevant, and troubling
for inference, however, is that
Souter’s dramatic doctrinal move to
the left would have led to mispredic-
tions in the case of Rust within three
terms of the justice’s first year and in
the case of Lee, just one term there-
after. Indeed, if the Court had heard
Lee during Souter’s freshman—
instead of sophomore—year, in all
41. We derive the figure of 1,937 from the July
2007 release of Harold J. Spaeth’s U.S. Supreme
Court Judicial Database, with analu=0 and dec
type=1, 6, or 7.
42. We could probably say the same of other
extremists who grew only more extreme over time
(e.g., Brennan and Marshall). For these justices,
as for Scalia, their ideological transformations,
from liberals (conservatives) in their first year to
more extreme liberals (conservatives) in later
terms, likely failed to translate into consequential
doctrinal change.
Figure 9: Time series plot of Justice
Scalia’s estimated ideal points,
1986-2005 terms.
The vertical axis is the estimated ideal point scale, such that higher values are more
conservative. The horizontal lines are the cut points for Dickerson v. United States,
Adarand Constructors v. Pena, and Lawrence v. Texas such that points above the line
indicate a probability of greater than .50 of voting conservatively; those below the line
indicate a greater than .50 probability of voting in the liberal direction (as the Court did
in Dickerson and Lawrence but not in Adarand).
Antonin Scalia revealed
conservative preferences at the
outset of his career, and simply
grew more reliably conservative
with time.
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likelihood he would have voted to
uphold the prayer. That vote, in
turn, may have been enough to con-
vert a five-person majority to strike
the prayer into a five-person major-
ity to uphold it (a step many com-
mentators of the day had expected
the Court to take). With little doubt
forecasts of Souter’s “loyalty to
Republican extremism” based on
his initial period of service were
doomed to statistical and jurispru-
dential failure.43
The same likely holds about infer-
ences of Earl Warren’s preferences
in the area of criminal law—or, at
minimum, in the landmark opinion,
his opinion, in Miranda. As the right
panel of Figure 10 shows, had
Miranda arrived in his first year, the
Chief may well still have written the
opinion of the Court, but not one in
Ernesto Miranda’s favor.
Souter and Warren provide classic
examples of the convergence of sta-
tistical and substantive significance.
Our examination shows that well
before their first decade of service,
both departed—to a statistically sig-
nificant degree—from their first
year preferences; and our doctrinal
analysis in Figure 10 reveals that
those statistical departures manifest
in changes of consequence—at the
least, for several high-profile cases
and perhaps for many others as well.
These results are hardly startling:
for both Souter and Warren, move-
ment from their first-year ideal
points was eventually so dramatic
that contemporary scholars hardly
missed it. But instability need not
be as extreme for substantive
change to result. In a paper on the
Court’s median justice, Martin,
Quinn, and Epstein demonstrate as
much about Sandra Day O’Con-
nor’s gradual drift to the left (also
documented in Figure 5).44 They
show that had Justice O’Connor’s
freshman preferences remained
stable, odds are that she would not
have provided the fifth vote to
uphold Michigan Law School’s
affirmative action program in the
43. Quoted in Daley, supra n. 12.
44. Martin, Quinn and Epstein, supra n. 31.
Figure 11: Time series plot of Chief 
Justice Rehnquist’s estimated
ideal points, 1970-2004 terms.
The horizontal lines are the cutpoints for Adarand Constructors v. Pena, Lawrence v.
Texas, Dickerson v. United States and Wiggins v. Smith such that points above the line
indicate a probability of greater than .50 of voting conservatively; those below the line
indicate a greater than .50 probability of voting in the liberal direction (as the Court did
in all but Adarand)
Figure 10: Time series plots of Justice 
Warren’s (left panel) and 
Justice Souter’s (right panel) 
estimated ideal points.
The horizontal lines are the cut points for Rust v. Sullivan, Lee v. Weisman, and
Miranda v. Arizona such that points above the line indicate a probability of greater than
.50 of voting for the government (as the Court did in Rust); those below the line
indicate a greater than .50 probability of voting for the defendant/plaintiff (as the Court
did in Lee and Miranda)
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2003 case, Grutter v. Bollinger.
An even more surprising example
may be Chief Justice Rehnquist,
whose ideal points we depict in Fig-
ure 11. Displayed as well are the cut
points for Lawrence, Adarand, and
Dickerson, along with Wiggins v. Smith
(holding that the defendant’s attor-
ney had failed to provide effective
counsel during the sentencing phase
of his capital case). Observe that in
neither Adarand nor Lawrence did
Rehnquist’s leftward trend translate
into doctrinal change: Odds are that
at no point in his career would he
have voted to invalidate the sodomy
law at issue in Lawrence or uphold the
affirmative action program in
Adarand. And, in fact, he dissented
in both. The criminal cases present a
different picture. Had either
appeared in Rehnquist’s first term,
we predict that the then-associate
justice would have ruled for the gov-
ernment. It was only in the latter part
of his career, when he moved suffi-
ciently to the center, that the odds
shifted in favor of the defendant.
And, in fact, in both Dickerson and
Wiggins Rehnquist cast votes against
the government.
Concluding thoughts 
In the conclusion of his important
1993 study, Hagle reported evidence
of “significant voting instability”
among the justices he examined.45
While his results have not lacked for
challengers, our study provides strong
corroborating evidence. Exploiting
statistical tools unavailable to Hagle
in 1993 or even his adversaries, we
find that virtually all Supreme Court
justices exhibit significant drift from
their first-term preferences; and that
drift occasionally manifests in doctri-
nal change of consequence.
These are the primary lessons of
our study, and ones, we hope, that
work to resolve a long standing
debate in the field. But important
challenges remain. While we can say
with a high degree of certainty that
most justices will move from their
first-term preferences, we can specify
with no degree of certainty in what
direction they will move, nor
whether their movement will carry
important doctrinal consequences.
Think about the two justices with
whom we started our paper, Alito and
Roberts. To be sure, our results here
indicate that unless either is highly
anomalous—a Potter Stewart or
Frank Murphy—drawing inferences
about their future behavior, as com-
mentators are already doing, is an
enterprise doomed to failure. What
we do not know is whether the two
George W. Bush appointees will
come to resemble an Antonin Scalia,
that is, a conservative who simply
grew more conservative. Or, whether
they will follow the path of their pred-
ecessors, O’Connor and Rehnquist,
and gradually move in the opposite
direction from their first-year ideal
points46—in which case the potential
for consequential doctrinal change
looms large. Of course, it would loom
even larger were the two new justices
to morph into Blackmuns, Frank-
furters, Souters, Warrens, justices
whose first-term behavior actually
provided misinformation about their
future preferences.
In light of our empirical findings,
gaining leverage on these alterna-
tives—whether for Roberts, Alito, or
justices past, present, and future—
strikes us as a crucial next step. But it
is one that requires the development
of a theoretical account of why jus-
tices move from their initial prefer-
ences. Otherwise, speculation on the
direction and consequences of insta-
bility is just as perilous as inferences
that assume a lack of instability.
If we have provided scholars with
some incentive to take on the task of
developing such an account, as we
hope we have, they need not pursue it
blindly. Conceptually, several contem-
porary writers have provided some
tantalizing leads. Michael Dorf, for
example, argues that justices who
come to the Court with executive
branch experience are unlikely to
move from their initial preferences;47
and, perhaps not unrelatedly,
Lawrence Baum suggests that Repub-
lican appointees from outside the
beltway are more likely to shift to the
left than Republican appointees who
are D.C. residents.48 Another possibil-
ity is that justices ascending to the
Court from the federal circuits should
exhibit relatively weak newcomer
effects. If Baum is right, this effect
may be even less still for those coming
from the D.C. court of appeals. 
Turning to methods, analysts could
deploy the data developed here to con-
struct an indicator of the “on average”
deviation (from a first-year baseline),
thereby adding a “how much” dimen-
sion to the “either/or” that we explore
in this paper. With this measure in
hand, assessing explanations of the
influences of variability from freshman
behavior should pose few problems.
Whether scholars pursue these
leads or develop their own
approaches is, of course, less the
point than the need to undertake the
mission in the first place. Given the
empirical findings here, the time
seems especially ripe to move beyond
description and towards the crucial,
yet still unrealized, goal of devising an
explanation of instability and its
impact on doctrinal development. g
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